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Preface
In recent years, federal courts have tried an increasing number of sus-
pected terrorists. In fact, since 2001, federal courts have convicted over 403 
people for terrorism-related crimes.1 Although much has been written about 
the normative question of where terrorists should be tried, scant research exists 
about the impact these recent trials have had upon the Article III court system. 
The debate, rather, has focused almost exclusively upon the proper venue for 
these trials and the hypothetical problems and advantages that might inhere 
in each venue.
The war in Afghanistan, presenting a host of thorny legal issues,2 is now 










1.	 Nat’l Security Division, Statistics on Unsealed International Terrorism and 




“[t]he	 legal	 issues	presented	by	our	nation’s	fight	with	 this	enemy	have	been	numerous,	diffi-




3.	 See Rick	Hampson,	Afghanistan: America’s Longest War,	USA Today, May	28,	2010,	at	A1.
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have never endured wartime conditions for so long. As a result of this pro-
longed martial influence, it is clear that this war is corroding federal court 
jurisprudence. My research represents a first attempt at synthesizing what 
impact the war in general, and terror trials in particular, have had upon the 
federal courts. I argue that the hypothetical fear of “seepage” has become con-
crete. Indeed, judges already admit that the war has taken a regrettable toll on 
courts’ opinions.4
In a trend that should alarm both tribunal proponents and detractors alike, 
tribunals and criminal trials are gradually growing to resemble one another. 
While efforts to improve the military tribunal system have enjoyed a fair level 
of success,5 long-entrenched Article III standards are deteriorating at a pace 
that mirrors the pace of tribunals’ improvements. A cluster of recent cases, 
proposed bills, and regulatory actions have narrowed the gap between Article 
III courts and military tribunals considerably. When viewed as a whole, these 
blurred lines between the military and domestic spheres draw the federal courts 
into disquieting congruity with the tribunal system.
I argue that these decisions and bills have altered (1) habeas jurisprudence, 
(2) detention policy, and (3) criminal investigatory procedure. More specifi-
cally, I contend that, as a result of a decade of federal courts accommodat-
ing the government’s campaign against terror, the criminal justice system is 
beginning to resemble the very military tribunals that were once the antithesis 
of Article III courts. In Part II, I discuss how the federal judiciary’s perspec-
tive on habeas corpus review has shifted dramatically even since the beginning 
of the global war on terror. In Part III, I argue that recent court decisions and 
administrative agency actions have created an Article III-sanctioned indefinite 
detention system that is almost indistinguishable from Guantánamo Bay. In 
Part IV, I observe that courts have relaxed their threshold evidentiary require-
ments to a point that is strikingly similar to those of military tribunals. In 
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I. IntroductIon
There	exists	an	ongoing	debate	about	where	to	detain	and	how	to	
try	 alleged	 terrorists.6	After	 the	 events	 of	 September	 11,	 2001,	 politi-
cians	and	scholars	alike	grappled	with	an	array	of	questions	posed	by	






been	 “both.”	 The	 United	 States	 has	 tried	 and	 convicted	 terrorists	 in	
both	federal	courts	and	in	military	tribunals	for	similar	bad	acts.
Maintaining	 these	 two	 justice	 systems	 is,	 by	 any	 measure,	 a	
Sisyphean	 labor.	 Although	 both	 aim	 ostensibly	 to	 achieve	 the	 same	





Bay,	 Bagram	 Air	 Force	 Base	 in	 Afghanistan,	 and	 elsewhere	 —	 are	









6.	 See, e.g., Bruce	Ackerman,	The Emergency Constitution,	113	Yale L.J. 1029	(2004);	Janet	Cooper	
Alexander,	Jurisdiction Stripping in a Time of Terror,	95	Cal. L. Rev. 1193	(2007);	Curtis	A.	Bradley	
&	Jack	L.	Goldsmith,	Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,	118	Harv. L. Rev. 2047	
(2005);	David	Cole,	Enemy Aliens,	54 Stan L. Rev. 953	(2002);	Neal	Katyal	&	Laurence	H.	Tribe,	
Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals,	111	Yale L.J. 1259	(2002);	Charlie	Savage,	
Obama Team Split on Tactics Against Terror,	N.Y. Times,	Mar.	29,	2010,	at	A1;	Charlie	Savage	&	Scott	
Shane,	Experts Urge Keeping Both Civilian and Military Options in Terror Trials,	N.Y. Times,	Mar.	9,	
2010,	at	A15.
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who	 believe	 that	Article	 III	 courts	 should	 try	 terrorists	 as	 criminals,	
however,	 the	methods	and	procedures	used	 to	maintain	 the	 tribunal	
system	are	unnecessary	and	constitutionally	offensive.
Tribunal	opponents	have	 long	argued	 that	military	 tribunals	suf-




10.	 See, e.g.,	David	Glazier,	A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil over the Guantánamo 




11.	 See Military	Commissions	Act	of	2009,	10	U.S.C.A.	§§	948–950	(2009);	see also Joanne	Mariner,	





inhuman,	or	degrading	treatment.	See §	948r.	With	regard	to	admissible	evidence,	 it	 requires	a	
military	judge	to	examine	the	“totality	of	the	circumstances”	in	deciding	whether	evidence	would	
impact	the	defendant	unfairly.	See	 §	948r(d)(3)	(defining	these	circumstances	to	 include	“[t]he	














her	sources	would	all	be	subject	to	trial	by	tribunal.	See In re Guantánamo	Detainee	Cases,	355	F.	
Supp.	2d	443,	475	(D.D.C.	2005)	(quoting	transcript	from	oral	argument).	In	the	course	of	litiga-
tion,	however,	President	Obama’s	Department	of	Justice	has	utilized	a	marginally	more	nuanced	
approach	 when	 prosecuting	 terrorism	 supporters	 versus	 terrorism	 perpetrators.	Although	 the	
language	remains	unchanged,	it	appears	that	the	Department	of	Justice	has	conceded	its	inability	
to	 maintain	 a	 classification	 broad	 enough	 to	 covers	 jihadists	 in	Afghanistan	 along	 with	 Swiss	
grandmothers.
13.	 White	House	officials	have	admitted	 that	 the	Administration’s	uncertainty	about	 the	conse-
quences	of	capturing	alleged	Al	Qaeda	operative	Saleh	Ali	Saleh	led	the	White	House	to	order	his	
assassination	rather	than	capture	him	alive.	See	David	Cloud	&	Julian	Barnes,	U.S. May Expand 
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bunal	opponents	posit	 that	 the	surest	way	 to	 remedy	 tribunals’	 con-
stitutional	 failings	 would	 be	 to	 abolish	 the	 system	 and	 try	 terrorists	
















larly	 that	 the	 government	 will	 assassinate,	 rather	 than	 capture,	 many	 terror	 suspects,	 like	Ali	
Saleh,	whose	fate	is	harder	to	predict.
14.	 See, e.g.,	 Military Commissions Shouldn’t Be Used; Pentagon Rules Shortchange Justice,	 Human 
Rights Watch	(June	25,	2003),	http://hrw.org/	english/docs/2003/06/25/usdom6178_txt.htm.
15.	 Of	 these	trials,	all	have	suffered	from	severe	 idiosyncratic	defects.	See	David	Glazier,	A Self-
Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil Over the Guantánamo Military Commissions,	12	Lewis 
& Clark L. Rev. 131	(2008).	
16.	 Military Commissions,	U.S. Dep’t of Def,	http://www.defense.gov/	news/commissions.html	
(last	visited	Sept.	27,	2010)	(listing	names	of	proposed	commissions	cases).
17.	 See Nat’l	Sec.	Div.,	supra	note	1	and	accompanying	text.	
18.	 See	Editorial,	The K.S.M. Files,	N.Y. Times, Apr.	15,	2010,	at	A26.	Despite	this	presumption,	this	
debate	is	far	from	over.	There	are	several	bills	pending	in	Congress	that	would	strip	Article	III	
courts	of	jurisdiction	and	funding	to	hear	terror	cases.	See infra	notes	133-140.
19.	 See, e.g.,	Daniel	Byman,	Coming to America: We’re Likely to See More Attacks on U.S. Soil by Al-
Qaida Affiliates,	 Slate	 (May	 5,	 2010),	 http://www.slate.com/id/2253051	 (“[O]ne	 thing	 seems	
clear:	There	is	a	growing	danger	of	attacks	on	U.S.	soil	by	groups	affiliated	with,	but	not	formally	























stitutional	 guidelines	 unwaveringly,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 arbitrary	 and	
subjective	“kangaroo	courts”	of	the	tribunal	system.23	If	this	assump-
tion	were	true,	Article	III	courts’	heavy	terrorism	caseload	would	seem	










and	 international	 legal	 norms	 have	 enjoyed	 a	 fair	 level	 of	 success,24	





draw	 the	 federal	 courts	 into	 disquieting	 congruity	 with	 the	 tribunal	
system.	Specifically,	 these	decisions	and	bills	have	altered	 (1)	habeas	
jurisprudence,	(2)	detention	policy,	and	(3)	criminal	investigatory	pro-






23.	 See, e.g.,	David	Glazier,	Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal?: Judging the 21st-Century Military 
Commission,	89	Va. L. Rev. 2005 (2003) (arguing	that	military	tribunals	may	need	additional	due	
process	safeguards).
24.	 See David	S.	Cloud	&	Julian	E.	Barnes,	New Rules on Terror Custody Being Drafted,	L.A. Times,	
Apr.	15,	2010,	at	A1	(“The	Obama	administration	is	for	the	first	time	drafting	classified	guidelines	
to	help	the	government	determine	whether	newly	captured	terrorism	suspects	will	be	prosecuted	
or	held	indefinitely	without	trial.”);	see also Wiegmann	&	Martins,	supra note	7,	at	3	(“On	May	15,	
the	Administration	announced	five	rule	changes	.	.	.	as	a	first	step	toward	meaningful	reform	of	
the	commissions	established	by	the	MCA.”).
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roding	 federal	 court	 jurisprudence.	Court-watchers	have	 long	 feared	
the	danger	of	“seepage”	—	the	notion	that,	 if	 terrorists	were	tried	in	
Article	 III	 courts,	 the	 pressure	 to	 convict	 would	 spur	 the	 creation	 of	
bad	law	that	would	“seep”	into	future	non-terror	trials.30	In	this	Note,	




procedure,	 the	 opinion’s	 author	 admits	 how	 the	 courts	 have	 bent	 to	
accommodate	the	pressures	of	war:
25.	 See, e.g.,	Ex parte Quirin,	317	U.S.	1	(1942)	(which	upheld	the	jurisdiction	of	a	United	States	mili-
tary	tribunal	over	the	trial	of	several	Operation	Pastorius	German	saboteurs	in	the	United	States).
26.	 David	Feige,	The Real Price of Trying KSM: Defense Lawyers Will Inevitably Create Bad Law,	Slate	
(Nov.	19,	2009),	
27.	 Al-Bihani	v.	Obama,	590	F.3d	866,	881–82	(D.C.	Cir.	2010)	(Brown,	J.,	concurring).
28.	 See, e.g.,	Al-Bihani,	590	F.3d	at	881–82	 (Brown,	 J.,	concurring)	 (noting	that	“[t]he	 legal	 issues	




29.	 See Rick	Hampson,	Afghanistan: America’s Longest War,	USA Today, May	28,	2010,	at	A1.
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detention	 system	 that	 is	 almost	 indistinguishable	 from	 Guantánamo	
Bay.	In	Part	IV,	I	observe	that	courts	have	relaxed	their	threshold	evi-










II. Habeas Corpus and tHe suspensIon Clause
Much	 of	 the	 federal	 courts’	 terror	 jurisprudence	 from	 the	 past	
decade	focuses	on	the	writ	of	habeas	corpus.	Prior	to	9/11,	issues	sur-
rounding	 false	 imprisonment	 and	 the	 death	 penalty	 largely	 shaped	
habeas	case	 law.	Since	2001,	however,	 the	most	seminal	habeas	cases	
have	dealt	with	terror	and	executive	detention.	This	decade-long	pres-
sure	 on	 courts	 to	 conform	 habeas	 jurisprudence	 to	 the	 exigencies	 of	
wartime	 has	 all	 but	 emasculated	 the	 Great	 Writ.	 Congress	 has	 twice	
32.	 Id. at	882	(Brown,	J.,	concurring).
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tical	 obstacles	 inherent	 in	 resolving	 the	 prisoner’s	 entitlement	 to	 the	
writ.”38	In	the	case	of	the	Boumediene petitioners,	the	Court	found	that




















36.	 See Michael John Garcia, Cong. Research Serv., RL 34536, Boumediene v. Bush: 
Guantánamo Detainees’ Right to Habeas Corpus	4	(2008).	See also	Johnson	v.	Eisentrager,	339	
U.S.	763	(1950).
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D.C.	 Circuit	 opinions,	 Al-Bihani v. Obama42	 and	 Al Maqaleh v. Gates,43	
it	 seems	 that	 Boumediene’s	 facts	 mark	 the	 outermost	 bounds	 of	 the	
Suspension	 Clause’s	 reach.	 Indeed,	 post-Al-Bihani and	 -Al Maqaleh,	
an	enervated	Suspension	Clause	will	not	extend	beyond	Guantánamo	
Bay.	This	is	especially	important	because	both	Al-Bihani	and	Al Maqaleh	







Maqaleh will	 therefore	stand	as	 the	most	authoritative	 rulings	on	 the	
Suspension	Clause	for	the	foreseeable	future.
In	 Al-Bihani,	 the	 petitioner	 was	 a	 Yemeni	 citizen	 imprisoned	 at	
Guantánamo	Bay	since	2002.	He	contested	the	lawfulness	of	his	deten-
tion	and	alleged	substantial	procedural	defects	with	his	prior	habeas	
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procedural	 missteps	 as	 “harmless	 error”	 not	 amounting	 to	 constitu-
tionally	impermissible	behavior,52	a	decision	the	court	acknowledged	
resulted	from	the	war’s	corrosive	effect.53
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its	 application	 of	 Boumediene’s	 three-factor	 test	 makes	 uncertain	 pre-
cisely	 where	 else	 beyond	 Guantánamo	 the	 Suspension	 Clause	 could	
possibly	extend.
In	 its	 analysis	 of	 Boumediene’s	 first	 factor,	 which	 concerns	 the	
petitioners’	citizenship,	 their	status,	and	the	adequacy	of	 the	process	
leading	 to	 that	 determination,	 the	 court	 noted	 that	 the	 Al Maqaleh	
petitioners’	 citizenship	 and	 status	 “differ[ed]	 in	 no	 material	 respect	
from	 the	petitioners	at	Guantánamo	who	prevailed	 in	Boumediene.”58	












both	 Bagram	 and	 Guantánamo	 Bay	 being	 subject	 to	 U.S.	 leaseholds,	
the	court	claimed	that	the	“surrounding	circumstances”	at	Bagram	are	








nence,	nor is there hostility	on	the	part	of	the	‘host’	country.”65	Therefore,	












over	control	over	the	Bagram	facility	to	the	Afghan	government.	See Julian	E.	Barnes,	U.S. Aims to 
Share Afghan Prison,	L.A. Times,	Jun.	9,	2010,	at	A1.	The	United	States,	however,	would	“carve	out	
a	section	of	the	prisons	for	non-Afghan	detainees	who	would	remain	under	U.S.	custody.”Id.
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likely	it	 is	that	the	lessee	exercises	de facto sovereignty	over	the	land.	
But	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 formal	 “peace”	 or	 “hostility”	 between	 two	
nations,	the	court	turns	the	unobjectionable	logic	of	this	argument	on	
its	head.	To	declare	that	the	otherwise-pacific	base	at	Guantánamo	per-
sists	 in	 the	face	of	“hostility,”	as	opposed	to	the	tranquility	 in	which	
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analyses	 together	 pack	 a	 powerful	 one-two	 punch:	 habeas	 review	 is	
unavailable	in	nations	(a)	with	which	the	United	States	is	formally	at	
peace	 and	 (b)	 in	 which	 the	 United	 States	 has	 military	 forces	 subject	
to	the	“vagaries”	of	war.	Ironically,	this	logic	applies	neatly	to	Cuba’s	
nearest	neighbor,	Haiti.	Despite	being	at	peace	with	Haiti,	America	has	
















venue,	 with	 the	 only	 difference	 being	 the	 location	 of	 the	 prisoner	 at	
issue.	Finally,	 the	petitioners’	 argument	 that	 the	Executive	may	now	
capture	prisoners	anywhere	and	then	detain	them	beyond	reach	of	the	
Constitution	is	highly	salient.77	However,	the	court	gives	it	superficial	
74.	 See United Nations, UN Mission’s Contributions by Country 7 (Feb.	 28,	 2009),	 http://
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2009/	 feb09_5.pdf	 (identifying	 the	 number	 of	
United	States	 troops	and	police	active	 in	 the	 international	mission	 in	Haiti). See also U.N.	S.C.	
Rep.	of	the	Security	Council,	Apr.	13–16,	2005,	¶17,	U.N.	Doc.	S/2005/302	(May	6,	2005)	(detailing	
the	combat	deaths	of	several	members	of	the	United	Nations	mission	in	Haiti).	See generally U.N. 
Dep’t of Pub. Info., Stabilization Mission in Haiti: Facts and Figures,	http://www.un.org/
en/	 peacekeeping/missions/minustah/facts.shtml	 (2010)	 (providing	 references	 to	 Security	
Council	resolutions	authorizing	the	mission	in	Haiti	since	2004,	along	with	lists	of	contributing	
countries,	total	deployment	strength,	and	mission	fatalities).
75.	 See Cloud	&	Barnes,	supra note	13	(reporting	that	no	prisoners	have	been	sent	to	Guantánamo	
under	the	Obama	administration).
76.	 Al Maqaleh,	605	F.3d	at	98	(finding	the	arguments	against	allowing	the	Eisentrager prisoners	ac-
cess	to	civil	courts	even	more	persuasive	when	applied	to	Bagram)	(citing	Johnson	v.	Eisentrager,	
339	U.S.	776,	779	(1950)).
77.	 See id. (“[W]ithout	dismissing	the	legitimacy	or	sincerity	of	appellees’	concerns	[regarding	the	
government’s	possible	ability	to	transfer	detainees	to	avoid	constitutional	protections],	we	doubt	
that	this	fact	goes	to	either	the	second	or	third	of	the	Supreme	Court’s	enumerated	factors.”).
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81.	 See, e.g.,	Allison	M.	Danner,	Defining Unlawful Enemy Combatants: A Centripetal Story,	43	Tex. 
Int’l L.J. 1 (2007); Glazier,	supra note	10.








83.	 See Marc	Ambinder,	Inside the Secret Interrogation Facility at Bagram, Atlantic	(May	14,	2010),	
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/	10/05/inside-the-secret-interrogation-facility-at-






Detainees	 appear	 to	 have	 lost	 in	 their	 struggle	 to	 apply	 interna-





elsewhere.”);	Hilary	Andersson,	Red Cross Confirms ‘Second Jail’ at Bagram, Afghanistan,	BBC News	
(May	 11,	 2010),	 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8674179.stm	 (noting	 the	 existence	 of	
separate,	distinct,	and	until	recently,	secret	holding	facility	at	the	Bagram	Air	Force	Base).	
84.	 See Exec.	 Order	 No.	 13,492,	 74	 Fed.	 Reg.	 4,897	 (Jan.	 22,	 2009)	 (ordering	 the	 closure	 of	 the	
Guantánamo	 Bay	 Detention	 Center	 by	 Jan.	 22,	 2010).	 Nevertheless,	 The	 White	 House	 law-
yer	 who	 originally	 led	 the	 efforts	 to	 end	 Guantánamo’s	 role	 as	 a	 detention	 and	 tribunal	 cen-
ter,	 Daniel	 J.	 Meltzer,	 resigned	 in	 early	 May.	 See also Charlie	 Savage,	 White House Deputy 
Counsel Resigns,	 Caucus	 (May	 7,	 2010),	 http://thecaucus.blogs.	 nytimes.com/	 2010/05/07/
white-house-deputy-counsel-resigns.
85.	 See	Cloud	&	Barnes,	supra,	note	13.	See	also Ambinder,	supra	note	83;	Andersson,	supra	note	




























sion	of	peace”);	Jordan	J.	Paust,	Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons Detained 
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scheme.	Hamdi v. Rumsfeld	made	clear	that	America’s	military	engage-
ment	justifying	detention	could	last	indefinitely87	and,	even	if	the	war	
ended,	Al-Bihani v. Obama introduced	the	principle	that	detention	may	
outlast	the	end	of	an	engagement.88
Article	 III	 trials,	 therefore,	 seem	 to	 offer	 the	 greatest	 protection	
against	arbitrary	and	indefinite	detention.	Regardless	what	process	the	
courts	followed,	alleged	terrorists	would	still	receive	a	sentence	match-
ing	 the	 crime	 for	 which	 they	 were	 convicted.	 But	 a	 recent	 Supreme	
Court	 decision	 and	 a	 proposed	 rule	 from	 the	 Bureau	 of	 Prisons	 cast	
doubt	on	whether	Article	III	trials	—	and,	more	importantly,	Article	III	
sentences	—	will	continue	to	protect	against	indefinite	detention.
The	Supreme	Court’s	ruling	in	United States v. Comstock	sets	a	dis-
turbing	precedent	for	terrorist-detainees.89	Comstock	involved	sentenc-
ing	issues	for	sex	offenders,	a	topic	seemingly	unrelated	to	terrorism.	


































91.	 See, e.g.,	Lauren	M.	Kulpa,	Comment,	U.S.	v.	Comstock,	43	Loy. L.A. L. Rev. (forthcoming	2011)	
(noting	 prominent	 criticisms	 regarding	 Comstock’s	 potential	 impact	 in	 terror-related	 incarcera-
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The	statute	at	issue	in	Comstock authorizes	a	court	to	civilly	com-







































95.	 Center on Law & Sec., New York Univ. Sch. of Law, Highlights from the Terrorist Trial 




99.	 Highlights from the Terrorist Trial Report Card,	supra note	95.
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It	 is	 not	 hard	 to	 imagine	 a	 slightly	 altered	 version	 of	 the	 statute	
at	 issue	 in	Comstock	 applying	 in	a	 terrorism	context.	Congress	 could	
tweak	 the	 Comstock statute	 to	 allow	 indefinite	 detention	 based	 on	 a	
finding	that	a	prisoner	(1)	previously	“engaged	or	attempted	to	engage	
in	 [terrorism-related]	violent	 conduct,”	 (2)	 remains	 committed	 to	his	
terrorist	cause,	and	(3)	as	a	result	of	his	terrorism	connections,	remains	
“dangerous	to	others”	such	that	“he	would	have	serious	difficulty	in	
refraining	 from	[terrorist	or]	violent	conduct	 if	 released.”	 In	essence,	
Comstock permits	the	Executive	to	entertain	the	notion:	“once	a	danger	
to	children,	always	a	danger	to	children.”	This,	 in	itself,	 is	troubling.	
The	 more	 troubling	 analogue,	 though,	 is	 “once	 a	 terrorist,	 always	 a	
terrorist,”	 which	 seems	 a	 likely	 conclusion	 given	 predictions	 that	Al	
Qaeda	will	never	cease	to	exist.102	If	Al	Qaeda	or	its	analogues	are	still	
operational	 upon	 a	 prisoner’s	 scheduled	 release,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 see	
100.	Id.
101.	See generally	 Peter	 Finn,	 Panel on Guantanamo backs indefinite detention for some,	 Wash. Post,	




uations.	 .	 .	 .	 [Y]ou	 never	 know	 how	 close	 you	 are	 to	 reaching	 an	 objective.”	 Michael	 Brenner,	
Al-Qaeda On the Ropes?,	 Huffington Post	 (Apr.	 26,	 2010),	 http://www.huffingtonpost	 .com/
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Haute	 and	 it	 seemed	 that	 the	 CMU	 “experiment”	 would	 be	 phased	
out.111	Instead,	the	new	proposed	rule	codifies	the	current	CMU	scheme	
of	 segregated	 detention	 and	 permits	 federal	 prisons	 throughout	 the	
United	States	to	institute	their	own	CMUs.	Citing	the	need	to	protect	






106.	Dean	Kuipers,	Isolation prisons under fire,	L.A. Times,	Jun.	18,	2009,	at	A11.	
107.	See, e.g.,	Dan	Eggen,	Facility Holding Terrorism Inmates Limits Communication,	Wash. Post,	Feb.	
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(b)	 The	 inmate’s	 current	 offense(s)	 of	 conviction,	
or offense conduct,	 or	 activity	 while	 incarcerated,	
indicates	 a	 propensity	 to	 encourage,	 coordinate,	
facilitate,	or	otherwise	act	in	furtherance	of,	illegal	




connection	 exist	 to	 justify	 CMU	 detention.117	 And,	 despite	 the	 rule’s	
stated	 purpose	 of	 preventing	 all	 forms	 of	 dangerous	 communica-
tion	from	all	groups	of	prisoners,	the	short	history	of	CMUs	thus	far	




















(requiring	 demonstrated	 attempt	 to	 make	 an	 impermissible	 contact	 while	 also	 allowing	 CMU	
designation	based	solely	on	conviction	offense).	




within	 the	 United	 States.	 Suspected	 terrorists	 can	 be	 held	 in	 highly	
monitored	and	austere	containment,	indefinitely.	This	not	only	mirrors	
the	military	tribunal	detention	system,	but	in	many	ways,	exacerbates	
its	 perceived	 infirmities.	 For,	 although	 the	 Obama	 Administration	
has	acknowledged	that	it	will	indefinitely	detain	some	terrorists	even	
after	 they	 complete	 their	 tribunal-imposed	 sentences,119	 the	 range	 of	
those	 persons	 implicated	 by	 military	 tribunals	 is	 much	 smaller	 than	
the	 reach	 of	 Comstock	 and	 the	 CMU	 regulations.120	 The	 Government	
has	 conceded	 that	 the	 Authorization	 for	 Use	 of	 Military	 Force	 per-
mits	 Executive	 detention	 only	 of	 non-citizen	 enemy	 combatants	 and	
unprivileged	belligerents.121	Thus,	 the	biggest	 single	exception	 to	 the	
Executive’s	broad	military	detention	authority	had	been	American	citi-
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IV. CrImInal ProCedure









of	 bills	 proposed	 by	 Congress	 and	 a	 decision	 handed	 down	 by	 the	
















does	not	necessarily	equate	with	actual	dangerousness.	See Del	Quentin	Wilber,	U.S. Can Continue 
to Detain Yemeni,	Wash. Post,	Dec.	15,	2009	at	A12	(“Musa’ab	Al-Madhwani	has	been	held	at	the	





126.	See, e.g.,	Al	Baker	&	William	K.	Rashbaum,	Car Bomb Leads to Evacuation in Times Square,	N.Y. 
Times,	May	2,	2010,	at	A1.
127.	Specifically,	 Shahzad	 is	 believed	 to	 be	 connected	 with	 either	 Jaish-e-Mohammed,	 “an	 Al	
Qaeda-allied	Pakistani	militant	group,”	or	the	Tehrik-e-Taliban	Pakistan,	another	al-Qaeda-allied	
Pakistani	militant	group.	Alex	Rodriguez,	Bomb Plot Linked to Militants,	L.A. Times,	May	6,	2010,	at	




by	Katie	Couric	with	Michael	Bloomberg,	Mayor,	New	York	City,	CBS Evening News with Katie 
Couric	(CBS	television	broadcast	May	3,	2010)	(on	file	with	Brief).	See also	Sean	Gardiner	&	Sumathi	
Reddi,	Bomb Was Crude but Lethal,	Wall St. J.,	May	3,	2010, http://online/wsj.com/	article/SB10
001424052748704608104575220623841113164.html	(“[It	was]	most	likely	the	work	of	an	American	
or	expatriate	living	in	America	that	is	not	a	trained	member	of	a	terrorist	organization.”).
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128.	See Terrorist	Expatriation	Act,	H.R.	5237,	111th	Cong.	(2010).	See also Miranda	v.	Arizona,	384	
U.S.	436	 (1966);	Edward	Mason,	Brown, Lieberman Bill Would Strip Citizenship of Terror Suspects,	
Bos. Herald,	May	6,	2010,	http://www.bostonherald.com/news/us_politics/view.bg?articleid=	













that	the	individual	knows	he	is	free	to	exercise	the	privilege	at	that	point	in	time.”	Id. See also Sol	







134.	See	 Stein,	 supra note	 128	 (“Indeed,	 what	 Lieberman	 is	 attempting	 to	 do	 is	 to	 pave	 the	 way	
for	terrorists	with	American	citizenship	to	be	thrown	into	military	tribunals	once	they	are	cap-
tured.”).	This	suggestion	seems	especially	likely	given	the	Supreme	Court’s	approval	of	a	“public	
safety”	exception	 to	Miranda	 if	 law	enforcement	officials	 feel	 compelled	 to	elicit	 time-sensitive	
information	 from	 a	 suspect	 immediately	 upon	 capture.	 See	 New	York	 v.	 Quarles,	 467	 U.S.	 649	
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As	increasing	numbers	of	would-be	terrorists	reveal	themselves	to	be	
American	citizens,135	 this	bill	attempts	 to	 remedy	 the	Miranda	“prob-
lem”	by	abandoning	the	criminal	justice	system	altogether	and	by	try-
ing	all	terrorists	in	military	tribunals.136	In	fact,	Congress	has	proposed	
ten	 bills	 to	 strengthen	 military	 tribunals	 during	 the	 111th	 Congress	
alone.	Three	bills	would	mandate	military	commission	 trials	 for	 cer-
tain	suspected	classes	of	terrorists.137	One	proposal	would	bar	any	pro-
ceeding,	including	a	military	tribunal,	from	taking	place	on	American	
soil	 (thereby	foreclosing	Article	 III	review	and	ensuring	a	 tribunal	at	
Guantánamo).138	 Three	 bills	 would	 strip	 the	 Department	 of	 Justice’s	







to	 strip	Article	 III	 courts	 of	 jurisdiction	 and	 funding.	 In	 response	 to	




the	so-called	Christmas	Day	Bomber.	See	Emily	Bazelon,	Miranda	Worked! The Bizarre Criticism of 
























140.	See	 H.R.	 4415,	 111th	 Cong.	 (2010)	 (granting	 the	 President	 the	 authority	 to	 determine	 which	
persons	are	subject	to	detention	or	military	commission	trial	as	unlawful	enemy	combatants).	
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incident.141	 Surprisingly,	 however,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 also	 modified	







“yes”	 to	a	question	about	whether	he	prayed	 for	 forgiveness	 for	 the	











are	making	America	 less	safe.	 In	 the	past	months,	all	 three	branches	




Article	 III	 courts	 have	 begun	 responding	 to	 congressional	 pressure	
141.	Compare	White House Press Briefing with Press Secretary Robert Gibbs	(C-SPAN	television	broad-
cast	May	6,	2010)	(noting	that	Lieberman’s	proposal	lacked	any	support	within	the	White	House),	









146.	See Wachtler,	 supra note	 130	 (“[M]any	 supporters	 of	 Miranda	 exclusions	 argue	 that	 the	 rule	
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regarding	America’s	 counterterrorism	efforts,	Berghuis is,	 at	 the	very	
least,	part	of	a	 larger	 trend	which	points	 toward	 the	conclusion	 that	
Article	III	courts	are	not	immune	to	the	corrosive	effects	of	an	ongoing	
war	against	terrorism.
B. Tribunal Procedures in Federal courTs
The	 recent	 trial	 of	Abu	Ali	 highlights	 this	 trend	 of	 relaxing	 pro-
























147.	See United	States	v.	Abu	Ali,	395	F.	Supp.	2d	338,	343-44	(E.D.	Va.	2005);	see also United	States	v.	
Abu	Ali,	528	F.3d	210,	221-26	(4th	Cir.	2008),	cert. denied,	129	S.	Ct.	1312	(2009);	Stephen	I.	Vladeck,	
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Under	what	is	known	as	the	“joint	venture”	doctrine,155	a	defendant’s	
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that	 prosecuting	 “those	 bent	 on	 inflicting	 mass	 civilian	 casualties	 or	
assassinating	 high	 public	 officials”	 is,	 in	 itself,	 an	 “important	 public	





Abu	 Ali	 at	 trial	 under	 the	 Classified	 Information	 Procedures	 Act	








ment	 witnesses	 that	 would	 introduce	 this	 classified	 information.172	






Abu Ali	 presents	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 a	 district	 court,	 faced	 with	
the	 complexities	 of	 a	 terror	 trial,	 deviated	 significantly	 from	 estab-
lished	 criminal	 procedural	 protections	 to	 accommodate	 the	 govern-
ment’s	interests.	As	Professor	Vladeck	notes,	the	Abu Ali	trial	“proves	
that	every	case	raises	its	own	unique	set	of	practical,	procedural,	and	
substantive	challenges.	“But	 .	 .	 .	where	unique	national	security	con-
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accommodations	 that	 take	 into	 account	 .	 .	 .	 the	 Government’s	 inter-
est”	along	with	 the	defendant’s.175	 Indeed,	when	viewed	as	a	whole,	









military	 tribunals.	 The	 relaxed	 Miranda	 requirements,176	 the	 weigh-

























against	 Hashimi	 highlighted	 many	 of	 the	 dangers	 of	 terror	 trials,	 including	 the	 government’s	
success	in	restricting	access	to	potentially	damaging	state	secrets.	See Jeanne	Theoharris,	The Legal 
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Guantánamo	 Bay’s	 indefinite	 detention	 regime,	 and	 federal	 criminal	
trial	proceedings	of	terrorists	at	times	bear	an	eerie	resemblance	to	mili-
tary	commission	norms.
As	 much	 as	 one	 may	 endorse	 the	 apparent	 move	 from	 military	
commissions	to	federal	courts,	that	move	should	be	rejected	if	it	comes	
at	 the	cost	of	scarring	the	Article	 III	system.	Therefore,	both	those	 in	
favor	of	military	commissions	and	those	in	favor	of	federal	court	tri-
als	should	pause.	Regardless	of	whether	 it	may	be	desirable	 that	 the	







against	 Hashimi	 highlighted	 many	 of	 the	 dangers	 of	 terror	 trials,	 including	 the	 government’s	
success	in	restricting	access	to	potentially	damaging	state	secrets.	See Jeanne	Theoharris,	The Legal 



















al-Qaeda.	See Alex	Rodriguez	&	David	Zucchino,	U.S. Drones Leave a Trail of Discord,	L.A. Times,	
May	2,	2010,	at	A1	(discussing	State	Department	legal	advisor	Harold	Koh’s	approval	of	the	pro-
gram	despite	severe	disagreement	among	military	and	intelligence	personnel	regarding	the	tar-
geted	killing	program);	Scott	Shane,	U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of Radical Muslim Cleric Tied to 













Administrative Law Goes to War,	118	Harv. L. Rev. 2663,	2663,	2664	(2005).	Sustein	opined	that,	“[t]
he	President	may	use	‘all	necessary	and	appropriate	force.’	An	execution	of	someone	who	can	be	
detained	instead	is	gratuitous;	it	is	neither	‘necessary’	nor	‘appropriate.’”	Id.	at	2668.	
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